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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1946 
___________ 
 
JING CHUN LIU, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                              Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A078-435-237) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald V. Ferlise 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 3, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 5, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Jin Chun Liu seeks review of a final order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”).  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
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Petitioner is a citizen of China.  In 2001, removal proceedings were initiated 
against him pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien 
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.  Petitioner conceded 
removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture, based on his opposition to China’s population control 
policies.  In 2003, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied relief, finding no credible 
evidence of past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution, and ordered 
Petitioner removed to China.  In 2005, the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision.  In 2012, 
Petitioner filed a motion to reopen in the BIA, arguing that he had recently begun 
practicing Falun Gong and feared persecution on that basis if returned to China.  On 
March 22, 2013, the BIA denied Petitioner’s motion.  On April 5, 2013, Petitioner filed a 
counseled petition for review and a motion to stay removal in this Court.  We denied his 
stay motion on April 21, 2013. 
We begin by making clear the limited scope of this appeal.  We have jurisdiction 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) only with respect to the BIA’s March 22, 2013 order denying 
Petitioner’s motion to reopen.  The petition for review was not timely filed within 30 
days of the BIA’s 2005 order upholding the IJ’s removal order.  See 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(b)(1); Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995).  The 30-day limitation period is 
mandatory and jurisdictional.  See Vakker v. Att’y Gen, 519 F.3d 143, 146 (3d Cir. 
2008); McAllister v. Att’y Gen, 444 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen using the “highly deferential” 
abuse of discretion standard.  Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004).  A 
motion to reopen must be filed in the BIA within 90 days of the date of entry of the final 
order of removal.  INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  There is no time 
limit on filing a motion to reopen in the BIA if the basis of the motion is to apply for 
asylum and the motion is based on changed conditions in the country to which removal 
has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available or discoverable at the 
previous proceeding.  See INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  The 
evidence presented must be genuine, authentic, and objectively reasonable.  See In re S-
Y-G, 24 I.&N. Dec. 247, 251 (BIA 2007). 
We agree with the BIA that Petitioner’s motion to reopen was untimely.  The 
motion was filed over 7 years after the BIA’s May 9, 2005 final order of removal.  His 
motion was subject to the 90-day limitations period because it was not based on changed 
conditions in China supported by material evidence that was not available or discoverable 
at the time of the previous proceeding.  Instead, Petitioner’s motion sought reopening 
because he began the practice of Falun Gong in 2011 and feared persecution on that basis 
if returned to China.
1
  See Liu v. Att’y Gen, 555 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, 
                                              
1
 In support of his motion, Petitioner submitted a notice addressed to his parents in China 
by their local village branch of the Communist Party.  The notice, dated July 2012, stated 
that reports had been received of Petitioner’s participation in Falun Gong and demanded 
he cease his activities and return to China for “severe punishment.”  Petitioner also 
submitted a letter purportedly from his father stating that Chinese authorities had rushed 
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Petitioner’s motion to reopen fails to demonstrate that the treatment of Falun Gong 
practitioners in China has materially changed since the time of his removal proceedings.  
To the contrary, Petitioner acknowledged that “[t]he Chinese government banned Falun 
Gong in China for over 10 years now.”  We further note that the BIA found that the 
Communist Party notice, which was “unsigned and not authenticated in any manner,” 
was insufficiently reliable evidence.  It also concluded that the letter from Petitioner’s 
father was unauthenticated, speculative, and written by a third party, and therefore was 
similarly unreliable.  We agree that Petitioner did not establish through reliable evidence 
that the Chinese authorities were aware of his Falun Gong activities or that he would face 
persecution on that basis if returned to China.  Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 
BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion.
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into his home to serve the notice and demand Petitioner’s return to China for punishment. 
2
 Petitioner’s motion to reopen also asked the BIA to invoke its sua sponte authority 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  In denying reopening, the BIA refused to exercise that 
authority.  We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte 
authority.  Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2003). 
